Green Gold: Avocado price shocks and violence in Mexico by Roett, Katie
The University of San Francisco 
USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke 
Center 
Master's Theses Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects 
Spring 5-14-2020 
Green Gold: Avocado price shocks and violence in Mexico 
Katie Roett 
katie.roett@gmail.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.usfca.edu/thes 
 Part of the Other Economics Commons, and the Political Economy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Roett, Katie, "Green Gold: Avocado price shocks and violence in Mexico" (2020). Master's Theses. 1316. 
https://repository.usfca.edu/thes/1316 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, Capstones and Projects at USF 
Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's 
Theses by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library | Geschke Center. 
For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu. 






Department of Economics 
University of San Francisco 
2130 Fulton St.  
San Francisco, CA 94117 
 
Thesis Submission for the Masters of Science Degree  





Abstract: The role of economic incentives in political armed conflict is well documented, but there 
is very little evidence on a growing and increasingly globalized form of violence: organized crime. 
Most existing research focuses on the impact of price shocks on wages and how this affects an 
individual’s opportunity cost to join an armed group or political movement. However, unlike other 
violent groups, organized criminal groups do not compete for political power, but profits in illegal 
markets. In Mexico, these groups have more than doubled in the past two decades, leading to an 
explosion of violence and record high 35,000 people being murdered in 2019. Mexican cartels 
engage in rent-seeking behavior in both licit and illicit markets, especially in rural areas where 
illicit crop cultivation supports the drug trade. In this paper I use a differences-in-differences 
strategy exploiting variation in avocado and illicit drug prices from 2003-2018 to understand how 
price shocks to both legal and illegal commodities impact cartel competition in different markets. 
I find rising avocado prices have a significant effect on violent crime in avocado-growing 
municipalities at the monthly level. Cartels also are more likely to enter an avocado-growing 
municipalities as prices increase, and less likely to leave them. Avocados may also be 
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I. Introduction  
 
The direct and indirect costs of the war on drugs have been immense. An estimated $1 
billion per year is spent globally on the policing and interdiction of illicit drugs – a market 
conservatively valued at $330 billion.1 According to the UNODC, there is little evidence that 
the prohibitionist tactics these expenses finance are effective, and often place the highest cost 
burden on producer nations and marginalized communities in the US and Europe.2  
This paper seeks to contribute to this evidence gap by looking at how organized 
criminal groups in Mexico respond to different incentives to expropriate legal and illegal 
markets. I use the example of avocados to illustrate how positive price shocks to a high-value, 
export commodity crop can induce cartels to compete for rents in a similar way to illicit 
commodities. I also estimate the impact that these price shocks have on different violence 
outcomes. Finally, I observe if avocado prices induce any tradeoffs to cultivating this legal 
commodity vs. illicit crops. This paper is the second that I know of that empirically looks at 
how price shocks to a legal commodity impact cartel-related violence in Mexico.3 It also 
supports Sobrino’s (2020) novel work illustrating cartel competition as a mechanism for 
increased violence following a positive demand shock for heroin.  
Avocados serve as an interesting example of how price shocks to a legal commodity may 
have similar effects as price shocks to illicit goods in regards to cartel presence and related 
violence. The combination of increasing international demand for avocados, cartel splintering 
following Mexico’s drug war beginning in 2006 and decline of the drug trade’s comparative 
profitability in some areas over the last two decades has led to reports of increased 
expropriation of the avocado industry via direct extortion, kidnappings and killings of avocado 
producers, as well as direct purchasing of avocado orchards by various criminal groups. 
Between 2009 and 2013 alone, these groups expropriated an estimated 13 percent – $770 
million – of revenue from avocado producers.4   
This has large implications for policymakers who are trying to curb cartel violence. I 
find that increasing avocado prices have a significant impact on violent crime, making it more 
likely for multiple cartels to enter and less likely to exit avocado-growing municipalities. 
Evidence also points to potential complementary effects of avocado and illicit drug cultivation. 
Anti-drug trafficking policies in the past have often focused on the eradication and seizure of 
drugs, or incentivizing farmers to cultivate legal crops, like avocados. But these strategies may 
just shift cartel incentives to expand into expropriating legal markets and potentially generate 
even higher negative externalities in communities, particularly in rural areas.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II gives further background on the 
growth of the avocado industry, cartels in Mexico, and literature on price shocks and violence. 
Section III reviews the data used in my estimations. Section IV reviews my empirical strategy, 





1 Global Commission on Drug Policy. Taking Control: Pathways to Drug Policies that Work. Rio de Janeiro, 
2014. At: http://www.gcdpsummary2014. com/#foreword-from-the-chair) 
2 UNODC/WHO, International Standards on Drug Use Prevention, Second updated edition (Vienna, 2018) 
3 The first being Dube et al.’s 2016 work on maize price shocks and impact on illicit drug cultivation patterns  
4 Asmann, Parker. “Powerful Mexico Crime Groups Grew by Extorting Avocado Trade: Report.” InSight Crime, 




i. Commodity price shocks and violence  
 
Price shocks to commodities like avocados can affect crime in violence through several 
mechanisms. Most economic literature addressing the effect of price shocks and crime approach 
it from an opportunity cost perspective (Becker, 1968). Depending on whether wages from 
legal employment or criminal activity are higher, workers will choose whichever option yields 
greater returns. Under this framework, positive price shocks to capital-intensive goods should 
increase violence through an appropriation effect. Conversely, a rise in the price of labor-
intensive goods reduces conflict, since wage effects are large and more labor is needed. Several 
studies have found this true for price shocks to agricultural commodities (Dube & Vargas, 2013; 
Dube, 2016; Gehring & Langlotz, 2018) in Afghanistan, Colombia and Mexico.  
Dal Bó and Dal Bó (2011) expand on Becker’s theory beyond individual choice to account 
for social network dynamics by creating a general equilibrium model of a small open economy 
that comprises two productive sectors and a third “appropriation” sector that is a fraction of 
what is produced in the first two sectors. They found that exogenous increases in the price of  
capital-intensive goods will cause the appropriation sector to expand, but that social backlash of 
appropriation activities is sometimes so strong that positive shocks can actually make a 
conflict-free economy worse off.  
However, much of this literature makes a big assumption about individual choice and one’s 
ability to have the freedom to choose whether to engage in crime or not.  It also ignores the 
role of non-formal institutions and social networks. In many states with weak property rights 
and institutions, non-state like organized criminal groups can have varying degrees of influence 
on local economies that can determine how price shocks affect different communities. As a 
result, some shocks – even if they are to labor intensive goods – can intensify violence or 
increase the probability of conflict when they benefit illegal organizations.  
One recent study looks at price shocks from both an economic and state-formation 
perspective. The author analyzes rebel group behavior in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo and models the impact of price shocks and how they affect decisions of different rebel 
groups to expropriate or not (Sánchez de la Sierra, 2020). Using historical survey data, the 
author looks at price shocks on gold (small and capital-intensive) and coltan (bulky and labor-
intensive), finding that increases in the world price of minerals led to the establishment – or 
attempted establishment – of monopolies of violence,5 but only if these minerals are easy to tax, 
as was the case with coltan but not gold. Unlike previous findings on price shocks, demand for 
labor-intensive commodities increased violence (since the violent groups sought to appropriate 
revenues) while it left the rates of pillages and arbitrary expropriations unaffected. This 
research suggests that the effect of price shocks are likely more nuanced than previously 
theorized, depending not only on individual utility but also heavily on local context, non-state 
group structure and non-political incentives of these groups.  
 
ii. Avocado demand growth in the US  
 
 
5 A “monopoly on violence” in political science refers to the concept that the state alone has the right to use or 
authorize the use of physical force. A criminal organization or other non-state group operating in an area with 
weak formal state presence often compete with other groups to establish a “monopoly of violence” over an area, 
taking on state functions like taxation, providing social services, defending territory from invading groups, etc.  
Nine out of every 10 imported avocados in the United States come from Mexico. Michoacán 
is the only state certified to export the fruit to the U.S., making up 80% of the state’s total 
export market.6  Between 2001 and 2010, avocado production tripled and exports increased 
tenfold, with sales valued at $2.8 billion in 2019 – surpassing both oil and estimated marijuana 
revenues.7 More than 30,000 avocado orchards now cover 23 percent of Michoacán, far 
surpassing the next growing state (Jalisco, which grows about 17,000 hectares), making it the 
avocado capital of the world (Hansen, 2017).  
This boom began following the North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994 and 
subsequent lift of a ban on avocados from Mexico three years later. Promotion programs have 
been credited as the main driver behind increasing demand and year-to-year sales increases 
through effective marketing for events like the Super Bowl and promoting the fruit as a 
nutritional “super fruit.” Aggregate demand for avocados at the retail level is generally 
inelastic; an increase in shipments of 2% is predicted to decrease shipper prices by 10% under 
constant demand (Ambrozek et al. 2018).  
 
iii. Cartels and illegal markets in Mexico 
Economic theory on firm competition and anecdotal evidence from Mexico and other 
countries suggest that not only is violence used to compete in illegal markets, but that 
increasing prices of a commodity will induce criminal groups to compete for expected revenues 
(Sobrino 2020; Millán-Quijano 2019; Dimico 2017; Kugler, Verdier, and Zenou 2005; Donohue 
and Levitt 1998; Fiorentini 1995). Rates of violence increase because competing groups seek to 
enter new markets, increase their current market share, or try to deter the entry of new groups 
to their territory. This has been empirically shown in Colombia with cocaine (Millán-Quijano, 
2019), Afghanistan with heroin (Gehring et al. 2018), Brazil with the illegal mahogany trade 
(Chimeli and Soares, 2017) and recently with heroin in Mexico (Sobrino 2020).  This paper’s 
empirical strategy relies on the assumption that cartels in Mexico behave like profit-seeking 
firms, and that violent crime increases though this competition mechanism, rather than the 
wage mechanism that drives violence in areas where groups rely on the local support of people 
or actively recruit local populations.  
 
III. Data 
For my monthly analysis corresponding to equation 1 I construct a panel dataset of 2,456 
rural municipalities over the period of 2011-2018 to gauge the impact of price changes on a 
series of violent outcomes, including homicides, extortions and kidnappings at a monthly level 
(Table 1). Crime statistics are provided by Mexico’s National Institute of Statistics and 
Geography (INEGI) and the Executive Secretariat of the National Public Security System 
(SESNSP). INEGI has measured monthly homicides by state and municipality since 1990, 
SESNSP provides state-level crime data going back to 1997, and municipal-level crime data 
going back to 2011. Avocado import value is measured in real USD and import quantity in 
metric tonnes. All import measures are provided by the United States Department of 
Agriculture’s Global Agricultural Trade System (GATS). Agricultural production data at the 
municipal level is measured in metric tons and provided by Mexico’s Secretariat of Agriculture 
 
6 Larmer, Brook. “How the Avocado Became the Fruit of Global Trade.” The New York Times. The New York 
Times, March 27, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/magazine/the-fruit-of-global-trade-in-one-fruit-
the-avocado.html. 
7 Pérez, David Marcial. “La Maldición Del Aguacate.” EL PAÍS. Ediciones EL PAÍS S.L., February 2, 2019. 
https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/02/01/actualidad/1549049608_676151.html. 
and Rural Development (SAGARPA), and is. Population data comes from Mexico’s National 
Population Council (CONAPO). 
For data corresponding to the annual level regressions in equations 2-4, I look at the same 
municipalities but from 2003-2018 due to more availability of crime and agricultural data. For 
equation 3, crime statistics and US import data are aggregated from INEGI, SESNSP and 
GATS. International narcotic prices provided by the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC), with wholesale and retail prices in USD going back to 1990 in both Europe 
and the United States. Eradication of marijuana and heroin poppies is calculated by the 
Mexican military (SEDENA) at the municipal level, going back to 1990, and are used as a 
proxy for illicit drug production.  
For equation 2, cartel presence is measured at the annual level by municipality from 2003 to 
2018 and comes from a novel dataset constructed by Sobrino (2020) that scrapes Google News 
and uses natural language processing. I construct variables indicating cartel entry and exit into 
municipalities based on Sobrino’s work on heroin price shocks and cartel violence using 
exogenous variation in demand for heroin from the 2010 OxyContin reformulation. Equation 3 
uses the same annual-level avocado import and production data regressed on SEDENA 
eradication and seizure data to look at tradeoffs to cultivation, following Dube et al.’s (2016) 
framework on maize price shocks.  
A critical problem with the crime data is underreporting – only 9 out of every 100 crimes 
result in convictions8 – and unreliability in reporting due to corruption. There’s also certain 
gaps in the data depending on what administration is in power and corresponding changes in 
policy of data collection, which need to be controlled for. For example, the Mexican attorney 
general reported early figures on “drug-related” homicides from 2000-2008, stopped for about 4 
years and then resumed. One other issue is an endogeneity concern of using marijuana and 
heroin poppy eradication as a proxy for production in different municipalities, because 
eradication efforts can be due to local parties in power (officials from Mexico’s National Action 
Party have more hardline drug war policies than other parties, and this shapes local strategy to 
fight cartels) or just proximity to army bases or police stations. Dube et. al. (2016) control for 
these factors in their research on maize price shocks and farmer decisions to grow marijuana, 
and find that even with endogenously targeted enforcement eradication still serves as a good 
proxy for production of illicit crops, so for the purpose of this analysis I will use the same 
measure.  
 
IV. Empirical Strategy  
This paper uses a differences-in-differences strategy exploiting time variation in US 
avocado import value and geographical variation in growing area within Mexico to estimate 
changes in violent crime, cartel presence and drug trade outcomes. For my main estimation I 
regress monthly US avocado import prices on municipal-level violent crime outcomes to 
determine whether changes in avocado prices disproportionately affect avocado-growing 
municipalities. The linear estimation of avocado prices on violent outcomes is given by: 
(1) 𝑌𝑚𝑡 =  λ(𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑚 × 𝐴𝑃𝑡)+ ∝𝑗 +  𝛽𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑜𝑝 +  𝜀𝑚𝑠𝑡 
where 𝑌𝑚𝑡 are violence measures including the log of homicides, extortions, kidnappings and 
burglaries in a given municipality m and month t, ∝𝑗 are municipality fixed effects, 𝛽𝑡 are 
month-year fixed effects and 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑜𝑝 is the natural log of population. I look at  𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑚 is a 0/1 
indicator variable indicating whether or not a municipality is producing avocados in a given 
 
8 “Impunity in Mexico: A Rising Concern.” Justice in Mexico, May 4, 2017. https://justiceinmexico.org/impunity-
mexico-rising-concern/. 
year and 𝐴𝑃𝑡 is the natural log of the U.S. import value of avocados in month t. λ is the main 
coefficient of interest, measuring the differential effect of avocado value on the outcome in 
municipalities with avocado production. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipal 
level. Homicides, extortions and kidnappings are the most common forms of cartel-related 
violence, while burglaries capture what home and business theft (i.e. stolen avocado trucks, 
avocadoes stolen from trees, etc.). I also look at the impact of log import value on financial 
crime (telephone scams, fraud, etc.), which should have no effect.  
 I then aggregate US avocado import value to the annual level and use a linear 
probability model to determine the likelihood of cartels entering or exiting an avocado-
producing municipality given annual changes in import value:    
(2) 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑡 =  λ(𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑚 × 𝐴𝑃𝑡)+ ∝𝑗 +  𝛽𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑜𝑝 +  𝜀𝑚𝑠𝑡 
Where  𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑡 is a dummy variable indicating the first occurrence of any cartel, a second 
cartel then third cartel entering a municipality m in year t. Then I look at the likelihood of the 
second and third cartel exiting, as well as more than one cartel being present in a given 
municipality and year. This is because as the value of avocadoes increase, the expectation is that 
cartels are driven by a “contest effect” to take control of avocado-growing territory, while also 
making it less likely for a given cartel to exit. ∝𝑗 are municipality fixed effects, 𝛽𝑡 are year fixed 
effects and 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑜𝑝 is the natural log of population.  𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑚 is a variable indicating whether or 
not a municipality is producing avocados in a given year and 𝐴𝑃𝑡 is the natural log of the U.S. 
import value of avocados in year t. λ is the main coefficient of interest, measuring the 
differential effect of avocado prices on the outcome in municipalities with avocado production. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipal level. 
For my last two regressions I compare annual avocado production and price to that of 
illicit drugs by interacting international drug prices and production, proxied by eradication and 
seizures. I first regress the same annual-level avocado interaction, in addition to poppy and 
methamphetamine interactions, on logged violent outcomes. This allows me to see how 
violence generated by competition around avocado rents might compare to the main source of 
cartel revenue; drug trafficking.  
(3) 𝑌𝑚𝑡 =  λ(𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑚 × 𝐶𝑃𝑡)+ ∝𝑗 +  𝛽𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑜𝑝 +  𝜀𝑚𝑠𝑡 
Here, all variables remain the same as equation 2, apart from 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑚 and 𝐶𝑃𝑡, where I 
separately regress the same annual avocado interaction, in addition to a poppy production 
variable represented by a dummy for whether or not poppy has been eradicated in a given 
municipality interacted with the log US average retail price of heroin (purity and 2017 inflation 
adjusted). I also interact an indicator for meth seizures with the log US average retail price of 
methamphetamine. 
Finally, using Dube et al.’s (2016) strategy, I see if avocado prices have any impact on 
farmer decisions to cultivate illicit crops by regressing the same annual avocado interaction 
used in equation 2 on drug seizures and eradication.  
(4) 𝐷𝑟𝑢𝑔𝑚𝑡 =  λ(𝐴𝑣𝑜𝑚 × 𝐴𝑃𝑡) + ∝𝑗 +  𝛽𝑡 + 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑝𝑜𝑝 +  𝜀𝑚𝑠𝑡 
Marijuana and poppy eradication are measured as log area eradicated per 10,000 hectares plus 
1, and all drug measured as the log of kilograms seized plus 1. All other variables remain the 
same as equation 2. I also include several robustness checks outlined in Tables A1-6. I drop 
northern states from my sample (in case the drug war in those areas may have biased my 
results upwards), use alternate price measures at the national, municipal and producer-price 
level to compare to the impact of US import value, and also use several alternate specifications 
for fixed effects and two-way clustering.   
 
V. Results  
Monthly regressions reveal that variation in avocado prices have a small but significant 
effect on homicides, extortions and kidnappings – the three main forms of violence employed by 
cartels, as well as burglaries. There is no effect on financial crime, as expected. Table 1 shows 
that for every 1% increase in avocado import value, homicides increase by .026%, extortions by 
.015%, kidnappings by .006% and burglaries by .030%, with significance at the 1% level. If the 
monthly import value of avocados increases 20% in January in anticipation of the Super Bowl, 
this would result in an increase of .48% in homicides, .27% in extortions, .10% in kidnappings 
and .55% in burglaries in avocado-growing areas. Results hold using alternate fixed effect and 
clustering controls (Table A.1).  
I also find that when aggregated at the annual level, cartels are more likely to enter 
avocado-producing municipalities as price increases, and less likely to leave them. The 
regressions from the linear probability model in Table 2 again show small but significant 
results. For every 1% increase in avocado import value the probability of a first cartel entering 
an avocado-producing municipality increases .0009%, a second cartel entering increases .0004% 
and a third cartel increases .0003%. The probability of more than one cartel being present in an 
avocado producing municipality increases .002%. Meanwhile, the likelihood of cartels exiting 
avocado-growing municipalities decreases, with the probability of the third cartel exiting 
decreasing .0002% and second cartel exiting decreasing .0007%. For reference, across the 
sample period (2003-2018) the total value of avocado imports from Mexico increased 40% on 
average year-to-year. These results are consistent with both previous empirical work on heroin 
price shocks conducted by Sobrino 2020, and with the literature on competition in illegal 
markets.  
Results from annual-level avocado and drug outcomes in Table 3 are less conclusive. 
Avocado, heroin and methamphetamine prices all have a significant effect on homicides in 
municipalities where these commodities are grown (or processed for meth). For example, a 40% 
increase in annual avocado and heroin prices would increase homicides by .76% in avocado-
growing municipalities, and .63% in poppy-growing municipalities, respectively. Results from 
previous research indicates this is likely a gross underestimation of the illicit drug trade’s 
impact on violent crime, pointing to the need to include additional controls – weather 
conditions, trafficking routes, suitability indexes, etc. – in these regressions and future analyses 
for both legal and illegal commodities.  
Finally, I apply Dube et al.’s (2016) method to see whether or not increasing avocado prices 
impact illicit drug cultivation patterns and farmer decisions, with opposing results. Where the 
authors in this paper find maize prices have an inverse relationship with drug eradication and 
seizures of raw outputs, I find that avocado prices have a significant direct relationship. In 
Table 4, for every 1% increase in avocado import value, marijuana and opium poppy eradication 
increase .031% and .046% respectively. Raw seizure of marijuana and opium gum also increase 
.017% and .005%. Meanwhile, apart from packaged marijuana, all other processed outputs have 
no effect or significance, which is in line with Dube et al.’s framework and the expectation that 
avocado prices impact planting and production decisions, but don’t necessarily affect drug 
processing (since processing does not need to take place where crops are grown). These results 
suggest that there may be increasing economies of scale in avocado production that encourage 
illicit crop production; particularly given poppy and avocados have the same agroclimatic 
suitability.  This is also in line with anecdotal evidence from farmers on companion planting 




This paper offers more insight on how variation in high-value, exportable commodities 
through the example of avocados can affect violence, cartel presence and the drug trade in the 
areas they’re grown in Mexico. It also contributes to the literature on organized crime and the 
impact of price shocks on violence. Using several sources of data on commodity prices, violent 
crime and cartel presence, I show through variation in prices and regional production how 
municipalities producing avocados may be more susceptible to external price shocks and 
organized crime. Future research should continue to focus on both the role of legal and illegal 
commodities, as laws relating to drug control continue to shift in the US and abroad. The 
continued development of datasets like that developed by Sobrino (2020) should also be 
prioritized in order to study non-wage incentives of profit-motivated non-state groups. 
Collecting evidence that deepens our understanding on the mechanisms and incentives of 
criminal groups will continue to be critical in Mexico, as cartel fragmentation and violence 
continues to rise.9 It’s particularly important for rural communities where these groups mainly 
operate. Globally, agriculture remains the main livelihood source for 36% of the world’s total 
workforce (up to 50% in Asia and 75% in Africa), with 1.3 billion people working in farming.10 
As climate change continues to shift and limit where certain crops can be grown – especially 
high-value fruits, vegetables and spices11 – policymakers need to be aware of the externalities 
associated with commodity price shocks in areas vulnerable to predation.  
The evidence presented in this paper and other research on cartel competition indicate that 
policies that aim to create “drug-free” societies through eradication and seizure operations may 
not actually have an effect on curbing violence perpetuated by drug-trafficking groups. In 
addition, development initiatives that seek to encourage farmers to shift cultivation from illicit 
crops to legal commodities, like avocados, must take into account the fact that farmers may still 



















9 2019 was Mexico’s most violent year yet to date (INEGI).  
10 Kuhn, Stefan, Santo Milasi, and Sheena Yoon. "World employment social outlook: Trends 2018." Geneva: ILO 
(2018). 
11 Similar dynamics are emerging with vanilla in Madagascar, where the spice is valued at $270 a pound — more 
than silver (NY Times).  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Monthly:  Observations Mean  
Std. 
Dev.  
Log homicides 148,356 .484 .760 
Log extortions  148,356 .109 0.37 
Log kidnappings 148,356 .032 .173 
Log financial Crime 148,356 .015 .148 
Log burglaries 148,356 1.14 1.52 
Log US avocado import value (USD) 180 18.55 .39 
Log US avocado imports from Mexico (tonnes) 180 10.80 .431 
    
Annual:  N Mean  
Std. 
Dev.  
Log population 36,192 9.72 1.61 
Log homicides 12,483 .484 .120 
Log extortions  12,483 .109 .321 
Log kidnappings 12,483 .032 .119 
Log financial Crime 12,483 .015 .124 
Log burglaries 12,483 1.14 1.46 
Log US avocado import value (USD) 15 18.55 1.12 
Log US avocado imports from Mexico (tonnes) 15 10.80 1.02 
Log rural avocado price (pesos) 39,358 1.63 3.46 
Log municipal avocado price (pesos) 39,358 2.47 5.32 
Log national avocado price (pesos) 15 6.77 .221 
First cartel 35,839 .064 .245 
Second cartel 27,259 .021 .144 
Third cartel 15,266 .011 .106 
Third cartel exit 1,022 .011 .105 
Second cartel exit 13,985 .98 .14 
Multiple cartels present 36,970 .044 .206 
Log marijuana eradication 39,250 .247 .965 
Log poppy eradication 39,250 .173 .900 
Log raw marijuana seizures 39,250 .156 .870 
Log opium gum seizures 39,250 .026 .325 
Log processed marijuana seizures 39,250 .755 2.31 
Log heroin seizures 39,250 .010 .178 
Log cocaine and meth seizures 39,250 .096 .716 
Log US average heroin retail price (purity and 2017 inflation adjusted) 15 6.82 .146 








Table 3 . Annual avocado import price, 
municipal production and cartel activity (2003-2018) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















       
Avocado x Price 0.090*** 0.040*** 0.025*** -0.020*** -0.065*** 0.15439*** 
(Log US price) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) 
       
Observations 35,839 27,259 15,266 1,022 13,985 39,970 















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Log  Log Log Log Log 
 Homicides Extortions Kidnappings Financial Crime Burglaries 
      
Avocado x Price 0.026*** 0.015*** 0.006*** 0.0006 0.030*** 
(Log US price) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) (0.0013) (0.010) 
      
Observations 148,356 148,356 148,356 148,356 148,356 
R-squared 0.74670 0.59007 0.32070 0.13688 0.90125 
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown and included 
are municipality and year fixed effects, and log population. Columns (1)-(3) represent a 0/1 dummy variable indicating the 
first occurrence of any cartel entering a municipality (1), then the first occurrence of a second cartel entering (2) and third (3). 
Columns (4)-(5) represent the second and third cartel exiting a given municipality, and column (6) represents any cartel being 
present. The avocado-price interaction represents a 0/1 indicator whether or not a municipality is producing avocados and log 
US import value (USD/tonne).  
*** Significant at the 1% level.    
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown and included are 
municipality and year-month fixed effects and log population. OLS is used for monthly regressions. The avocado-price 
interaction represents a 0/1 indicator whether or not a municipality is producing avocados and log US import value 
(USD/tonne). 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
 
Table 4. Annual avocado and illicit drug price, municipal production and crime 
(2003-2018) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Log Log Log  Log Log 
VARIABLES Kidnappings Extortions Homicides Financial Crime Robberies 
      
Avocado x Price 0.022*** 0.059 0.187 0.036 0.021 
(Log US price) (0.007) (0.075) (0.013) (0.008) (0.026) 
      
Poppy x Price 0.019** 0.344* 0.134* 0.003 0.002 
(Log US heroin price) (0.175) (0.206) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) 
      
Meth x Price 0.013** -0.019** 0.074*** -0.00788*** 0.00220 
(Log US meth price) (0.007) (0.008) (0.026) (0.00253) (0.00696) 
Table 5. Avocado price, production and illicit crops (2003-2018) 
 












         
Avocado x 
Price 
0.03112*** 0.04565*** 0.01679*** 0.00530**  0.07790*** 0.00039 -0.00017 
(Log US 
price) 
(0.00738) (0.01238) (0.00608) (0.00237)  (0.02033) (0.00195) (0.00878) 
         
Observations 35,147 35,147 35,147 35,147  35,147 35,147 35,147 




Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown are municipality and year fixed 
effects, and log population. OLS is used for crime regressions. The avocado-price interaction represents a 0/1 indicator whether or not a 
municipality is producing avocados and log US import value (USD/tonne). Poppy represents a 0/1 indicator for whether or not poppy has 
been eradicated in a given municipality interacted with the log US average retail price (purity and 2017 inflation adjusted) of heroin. Meth x 
Price is an indicator for meth seizures interacted with the log US average retail price of methamphetamine.  
***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 5% level.  
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown are municipality and year fixed 
effects, and log population. Log marijuana and poppy eradication are measured as log area eradicated per 10,000 hectares plus 1. All drug 
seizures are measured as the log of kilograms seized plus 1. The avocado-price interaction represents a 0/1 indicator whether or not a 
municipality is producing avocados and log US import value (USD/tonne). The “Other” category is cocaine and crystal meth seizures.  
***Significant at the 1% level. **Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 5% level.  
 
 
Table A1. Alternate controls: Log monthly US avocado price, municipal production and 
crime (2011-2018) 
 
 Log Homicides 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Avocado x Price 0.026*** 0.017*** 0.177*** 0.01696 
(Log US price) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.01080) 
     
Year-month FE X  X X 
Year FE  X   
Month FE  X   
State FE   X  
Alt cluster    X 
     
Observations 148,356 148,356 148,356 148,356 
R-squared 0.74670 0.74648 0.80479 0.74648 
 Log Extortions 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Avocado x Price 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.067 0.01645** 
(Log US price) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.00456) 
     
Year-month FE X  X X 
Year FE  X   
Month FE  X   
State FE   X  
Alt cluster    X 
     
Observations 148,356 148,356 148,356 148,356 
R-squared 0.59007 0.59003 0.44589 0.59003 
 Log Kidnappings 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Avocado x Price 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.00173 0.005** 
(Log US price) (0.002) (0.001) (0.00301) (0.001) 
     
Year-month FE X  X X 
Year FE  X   
Month FE  X   
State FE   X  
Alt clustering    X 
     
Observations 148,356 148,356 148,356 148,356 
R-squared 0.32070 0.32065 0.34878 0.33066 
 
 




VARIABLES Log Homicides Log Extortions Log Kidnappings 
       
Avocado x Price 0.026*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 
(Log US price) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) 
       
With northern states X  X  X  
No northern states  X  X  X 
       
Observations 148,356 140,052 148,356 140,052 148,356 140,052 
R-squared 0.74670 0.73910 0.59007 0.57676 0.32070 0.32176 
 Annual 
VARIABLES Log Homicides Log Extortions Log Kidnappings 
       
Avocado x Price 0.187 0.017*** 0.059 0.016*** 0.022*** 0.004*** 
(Log US price) (0.013) (0.005) (0.075) (0.003) (0.007) (0.001) 
       
With northern states X  X  X  
No northern states  X  X  X 
       
Observations 12,483 11,671 12,483 11,671 12,483 11,671 



















Table A3. Alternate pricing: Municipal annual avocado price, production and crime 
(2003-2018) 
 Log Homicides 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Avocado x Price 0.187 0.052 0.010* 0.030*** 
 (0.013) (0.051) (0.002) (0.008) 
     
Log US price X    
Log MEX price  X   
Log municipal price   X  
Log producer price    X 
     
Observations 12,483 12,483 12,483 12,483 
R-squared 0.91623 0.91623 0.91623 0.01313 
 Log Extortions 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Avocado x Price 0.059 0.078** 0.002 0.042*** 
 (0.075) (0.033) (0.002) (0.006) 
     
Log US price X    
Log MEX price  X   
Log municipal price   X  
Log producer price    X 
     
Observations 12,483 12,483 12,483 12,483 
R-squared 0.78580 0.78591 0.78582 0.00825 
 Log Kidnappings 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Avocado x Price 0.022*** 0.01573 0.001 0.002** 
 (0.007) (0.01527) (0.001) (0.002) 
     
Log US price X    
Log MEX price  X   
Log municipal price   X  
Log producer price    X 
     
Observations 12,483 12,483 12,483 12,483 
R-squared 0.71710 0.71702 0.71723 0.00571 
 
 
Table A4. Drug War control: Log heroin and meth price, municipal production and crime 
(2011-2018) 
 
VARIABLES Log Homicides Log Extortions Log Kidnappings 
       
Poppy x Price 0.134* -0.022 0.344* .323* 0.019** -0.007* 
(Log US heroin price) (0.008) (0.026) (0.206) (0.200) (0.175) (0.004) 
       
Meth x Price 0.074*** -0.026** -0.019** .016** 0.013** .016** 
(Log US meth price) (0.026) (0.013) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
       
With northern states X  X  X  
No northern states  X  X  X 
       




Table A5. Drug war & price controls: Annual avocado price, 
municipal production and cartel activity (2003-2018) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















       
Avocado x Price 0.038*** 0.009** 0.002*** -0.0006** -0.065* .077*** 
(Log US price: No 
northern states) 
(0.014) (0.043) (0.000) (0.001) (0.022) (0.036) 
       
Avocado x Price 0.090*** 0.040*** 0.025*** -0.020*** -0.065*** 0.15439*** 
(Log US price) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.008) 
       
Avocado x Price 0.00041** 0.00009 0.0010 -0.000 0.02149 0.08527* 
(Log MEX price) (0.00016) (0.00013) (0.00048) (0.000) (0.02579) (0.03581) 
       
Avocado x Price 0.0002*** 0.008* 0.044** -0.023 -0.0001 0.050 
(Log municipal price) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0002) (0.007) 
       
Avocado x Price 0.007* 0.043*** 0.016* -0.006** -0.00037 0.027 





Table A6. Drug War & alternate price controls: Annual avocado price, 





















         
Avocado x Price 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.003**  0.004 -0.045 0.0001*** 
(Log US price: No 
northern states) 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.039) (0.000) 
         
Avocado x Price 0.031*** 0.046*** 0.0179*** 0.005**  0.0780*** 0.000 -0.000 
(Log US price) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.002)  (0.020) (0.002) (0.009) 
         
Avocado x Price 0.00046 0.00043 0.00071* -0.00000  -0.00000 -0.00004 -0.00065 
(Log MEX price) (0.00038) (0.00042) (0.00038) (0.00012)  (0.00088) (0.00006) (0.00045) 
         
Avocado x Price 0.046** 0.043* -0.071* -0.000  -0.000 -0.004 -0.065 
(Log municipal price) (0.038) (0.042) (0.038) (0.012)  (0.001) (0.006) (0.045) 
         
Avocado x Price 0.069** 0.045** -0.000* -0.000  0.404 0.0009 0.007*** 
(Log producer price) (0.033) (0.026) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.096) (0.0004) (0.003) 
